conditions, the politicized places hypothesis can explain both individual attitudes and local political outcomes.
To
hear Americans talk about immigration, you might think their views developed mostly while shopping. For former Arizona State Represen tative Randy Graf, it was seeing a Spanish-speaking family using Food Stamps that triggered a personal crusade against illegal immigration (Lelyveld 2006) . In Los Angeles, a focus group participant explained his attitudes through an anecdote about having ordered a hamburger from someone with limited English and having received eight (Paxton 2006,554) . One Georgia resident came to dread Wal-Mart trips after realizing that at one point, she had been the only non-Latino customer (Aizenman 2007) . But are these local en counters actually shaping attitudes, or are they merely According to theories of racial threat, the rising num ber of immigrants will threaten long-time residents' political power and economic status, and thus will gen erate political hostility in heavily immigrant areas. But as its name implies, this theory was developed in an earlier era to explain black-white relations. To date, the empirical evidence applying this theory to immigrant populations has been inconsistent, with some studies finding evidence of threat and others finding null effects or even positive ones. As an alternative, this article de velops the politicized places hypothesis to explain how and when local demographics influence attitudes and local politics. Immigrants are often unable to vote, and they tend to work in segmented labor markets and live in segregated communities. All three factors minimize the threat they pose to long-time residents' interests, and even their visibility to native-born Americans. Su permarket encounters might be the exception, not the rule.
The key challenge for theories of racial or ethnic threat, then, is to specify the conditions that lead an out group to be perceived as threatening. In response, the politicized places hypothesis contends that when com munities are undergoing sudden demographic changes at the same time that salient national rhetoric politicizes immigration, immigrants can quickly become the tar gets of local political hostility. Sudden demographic changes generate uncertainty and attention. Cover age of immigration in the media can inform people about demographic changes and can politicize those changes in people's minds. Acting in tandem, local demographics and nationally salient issues can pro duce anti-immigrant attitudes and outcomes. One ad vantage of this approach is that it does not assume that individuals necessarily politicize their day-to-day encounters?or that they even pay much attention to their demographic surroundings. Also, by specifying when an outgroup will be perceived as threatening, the politicized places approach adds a dynamic component to theoretical approaches that are typically static.
As this article demonstrates, the politicized places hypothesis finds consistent support from many data sources, including twelve national surveys and a new data set of local anti-immigrant ordinances. The hy pothesis, outlined in the next section, can account for the inconsistency of past results, and can also help ex plain why local anti-immigrant proposals are clustered in time. The third section describes the survey data and methods. Comparisons of geocoded data from the Gen eral Social Survey (GSS; ,1996 , the National Election Study (NES; , 1996 , the Social Capital Community Benchmark Sur vey (SCCBS; , and a Knowledge Networks (KN; 2009) survey illustrate that living in communities with rising numbers of immigrants can reduce support for immigrants and immigration. But as the following section shows, that is true chiefly when immigration is a salient national issue. From statistical models, we learn that respondents in quickly changing counties are 10 percentage points (or 18%) more likely to want to restrict immigration when the issue is nationally salient than those in static counties. Here, rapidly changing means a county that has seen its percent foreign born rise by 7 percentage points in the past decade. The re sults come from an analysis of surveys administered at different times by different organizations, ensuring that they are not artifacts of house effects, mode effects, or the priming effects of any particular survey instrument. The subsequent section extends this finding by using panel data over the September 11 terrorist attacks. The influence of local contexts can appear and disappear in a matter of months, a fact that weighs against tradi tional theories of threat positing consistent local influ ences. The panel data used here are especially valuable, as they allow us to dismiss two persistent alternative explanations: that the salient national frames are en dogenous to local attitudes, and that the people who select into changing communities differ in unobserved ways from those who do not. Many analyses of threat look only at individual-level attitudes, but theories of threat also generate predic tions about which communities should consider anti immigrant policies. In fact, in all likelihood, interethnic attitudes have been of interest to so many scholars precisely because of their connection to intergroup re lations and policy outcomes. Here, too, the politicized places approach proves helpful. This article's second to-last section illustrates that a sudden increase in the number of immigrants is the most powerful predictor of which localities consider anti-immigrant ordinances. That holds even when comparing communities that were identical in key ways as of 1990. The confluence of national salience and sudden demographic changes triggered not only attitudinal changes, but a wave of local ordinances as well.
Certainly, we can be more confident in the cross sectional claims based on thousands of survey respon dents or hundreds of communities than the longitu dinal claims based on just thirty-nine months. Thus, the cross-sectional evidence on the influence of local demographic changes?a factor that has received little attention to date?seems especially powerful. But in all cases, politicized places better explains the observed patterns than other explanations, including those based on endogeneity or selection bias. The concluding sec tion outlines what the politicized places hypothesis could mean for the study of local and national immi gration politics as well as for our thinking about how local experience shapes attitudes. It also highlights the approach's boundaries.
BEYOND REALISTIC CONFLICT
Theories of racial threat or "power threat" are a sub set of theories of realistic group conflict (Wong and Drake 2006,5) with intellectual origins in the research of Key (1949) and Blalock (1967) . The central claim is that the presence of an outgroup in sufficient numbers will generate competition for scarce resources and thus local hostility} Since the mechanisms are exclusively local, the effect should be a function of local popu lation shares and vary over time only to the extent that population shares do. Threat might be especially acute in places of relative or increasing resource de privation (Branton and Jones 2005; Gay 2006; Olzak 1992) , or of rising outgroup political power (Dancygier 2007; Key 1949) . After a brief discussion of theories of racial threat, this section shows that such theories do not hold consistently when applied to immigrants. It then develops the politicized places hypothesis as one explanation for the mixed empirical results and out lines the key predictions that differentiate politicized places from other approaches. In recent theorizing, research on racial threat has tended toward one of four positions. The first holds that geographic proximity acts primarily by triggering political competition (e.g., Glaser 1994) . The second contends that proximity triggers a more diffuse, un differentiated prejudice (e.g., Taylor 1998). The third contends that ethnic and racial diversity can dampen both outgroup and ingroup cohesion (Putnam 2007) . And the fourth disputes the relevance of racial threat altogether (Voss 1996) , highlighting instead the role of socioeconomic contexts in shaping racial attitudes (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000 (Fox 2004; Morris 1997, 1998) . Threat operates in some cases, but certainly not in all. Given these cross-cutting results, a central theoretical challenge is to identify the conditions that are most conducive to threatened responses.
By considering the preconditions of intergroup threat, we can begin to understand why threat might not influence responses to immigrants. For classical threat to operate, people must perceive their ethnic and racial contexts (Wong 2007) . They must also per ceive the outgroup as a threat to resources needed for themselves or their group, whether those resources are economic or political. For the pre-Civil Rights Era South, these assumptions seem plausible. But they are less straightforward when applied to immigrants today.
First, Americans are surprisingly unaware of their de mographic surroundings. Chiricos, Hogan, and Gertz (1997) show that the correlation between actual and perceived neighborhood racial composition for whites is just 0.16, a finding confirmed by Wong (2007) . Neigh borhood segregation (Fischer 2003) 
Politicized Places
To be sure, realistic group conflict is not the only lens through which to view Americans' responses to local demographic changes. Scholars have also paid consid erable attention to theories of identity, and to the possi bility that local demographics might reinforce or under mine group identities (Bledsoe, Welch, and Sigelman 1995; Cain, Citrin, and Wong 2000; Wong and Drake 2006) . A related vein of work contends that atti tudes toward immigration are shaped by sociotropic perceptions about its impact on the nation as a whole (Citrin et al. 1997; Deufel 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004) as well as by differing conceptions of what it means to be an American (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Schildkraut 2005) . Identity-based approaches can explain why many local debates about immigration invoke the language of ownership, values, and dis possession (Horton 1995) rather than the language of resources or economic advantage. They can also make sense of the weakness of self-interest in pre dicting attitudes (Citrin et al. 1997) , and of the varying levels of European opposition to groups from differ ent countries of origin (Dustmann and Preston 2000) .
However, as applied to immigration politics, these ap proaches have not emphasized variation over time (e.g., Cain, Citrin, and Wong 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Schildkraut 2005; Sides and Citrin 2007 politics, destabilizing shared conceptions of the com munity's identity and future (Hopkins 2009; Horton 1995; Kruse 2005; Lassiter 2006; Rieder 1985) . In part, recent changes might mean low levels of inter-group networking, since such networks are likely to develop only over time (Pettigrew 1998) .3 Recent ethnic and racial changes can also signal a potential shift in the housing market (Gould 2000; Kruse 2005) . That is no small factor in a country where 69% of adults are homeowners and where homes typically represent one's largest investment (Fischel 2001) . The potency of ethnic change is not limited to the political class or to homeowners: a study of interethnic violence in New York City finds ethnic and racial change to be a key predictor (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998) . Thus, at the local level, sudden demographic changes might undermine long-time residents' expectations about the community and capture their attention in ways that levels of diversity do not.4
Still, changing demographics only catch local resi dents' attention. They do not necessarily connect those changes to politics. For that, people need salient frames that "define what the problem is and how to think about it" (Kinder 1998,170) . In other words, the demographic change might not be seen as having political ramifica tions unless frames are available that make those ram ifications clear. One source of such frames is individu als' ideologies and long-standing beliefs: conservatives might naturally connect immigrants to questions of law and order, for example, while liberals might understand them with respect to social inequality or civil rights. Yet, this, too, does not explain why we observe threatened responses only at certain moments in time.
Another source of frames?this one more obviously dynamic?is the mass media. Past work presents com pelling evidence that framing effects can shape the extent to which Americans' attitudes toward public policies are racialized (Gilens 1999; Kellstedt 2003) . This work fits with the more general theory of sym bolic politics, which explains attitudes by pointing to the presence or absence of symbols in political dis course (e.g., Sears 1993; Sears and Savalei 2006) . It holds that the most salient symbols in a political con troversy determine which predispositions are evoked. By highlighting the use of salient symbols in shap ing attitudes, theories of symbolic politics provide one building block for the politicized places hypothesis de veloped here. At the same time, the politicized places hypothesis contributes to past theorizing by specifying the condi tions of everyday life that make symbols or rhetoric more or less influential.5 Past research has also shown that the media can play a key role in politicizing day to-day experiences (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Kinder 1998; Mutz 1994) . Given that, the central claim of the politicized places hypothesis is that at times when rhetoric related to immigrants is highly salient nation ally, those witnessing influxes of immigrants locally will find it easier to draw political conclusions from their ex periences. This approach seems especially applicable in this case since Americans may not have well-developed attitudes on immigrants a priori, and might thus be susceptible to framing (Chong and Druckman 2007) . And it can explain how a relatively steady stream of immigrants produces anti-immigrant actions clustered in time and space. Typically, media effects are thought of as separate from contextual effects rooted in day to-day experiences, since they operate through quite distinctive channels (e.g., Gamson 1992; Mutz 1992 ). Yet the politicized places hypothesis undercuts that dualism by contending that the media can play a key role in politicizing local demographic changes.
As opposed to theories of realistic group conflict, the politicized places hypothesis posits that changes in demographics will lead to political hostility in af fected places. The overwhelming majority of past work has focused on levels of local immigrant populations. Yet one challenge with studying levels is that con tact theory, self-selection, and intergroup threat yield cross-cutting predictions (e.g., Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000) . If we observe that living near a large immi grant population is uncorrelated with a respondent's attitudes, is that because the contextual measure does not matter or because these mechanisms offset one another? Theorizing based on change is less prone to cross-cutting effects. While it is conceivable that sudden demographic changes could induce intergroup contact (Pettigrew 1998) , the historical record is quite consistent in showing negative responses to the sudden arrival of an outgroup (e.g., Horton 1995; Kruse 2005; Lassiter 2006; Self 2003; Sugrue 1996) . The politicized places approach further predicts temporal variation in contextual effects where past approaches have pre dicted effects that are consistent, at least over the span of several years. And instead of looking to national eco nomic conditions as a key source of temporal variation (Barkan 2003; Higham 1992) , it posits that contextual effects will vary with the national salience of immi gration. For Schmitt (1976) , the friend-enemy distinc tion defines politics; for the hypothesis advanced here, national politics indicates who one's local friends and enemies might be. We turn now to testing these propo sitions, first with survey data and then with community level data on anti-immigrant ordinances in U.S.
localities. 3
Indeed, Putnam (2007) 
MEASURING CONTEXTS AND ATTITUDES
The politicized places hypothesis indicates how local and national conditions might interact to change atti tudes. National political rhetoric could call attention to certain aspects of people's day-to-day environments, effectively politicizing them. Testing that possibility requires data from many sources, including surveys, newspapers, television transcripts, and local political processes. This section begins the empirical analysis by discussing the survey data.
Scholars of contextual effects typically choose be tween data sets that contain detailed contextual in formation for respondents in a small number of com munities (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995) or else geocoded national data sets with fewer contextual mea sures. Yet the latter provide more contextual variation, and?critically for this article?they allow for compar isons of contextual effects over time. The first analysis makes use of all available, nationally representative surveys about politics and public affairs which included the same question about levels of immigration. To be included, surveys had to make county-level geocodes available as well. This encompasses eleven surveys: the , 1996 , 1996 The KN survey was conducted specifically to add additional longitudinal variation to these analyses. It embedded a single question about immigration in a broader omnibus survey conducted on a subset of the KN panel from February 19 to February 23,2009.7 All variables were checked to ensure comparability across surveys, and were recoded to have the same range and polarity. Table A .l in the Appendix describes key vari ables in the most recent year available for each survey.8
The choice of the relevant contextual unit is a per petual question. Some contextual processes are likely to act in very small geographic areas, while others might act over a county, a metropolitan area, or even a state (Oliver and Wong 2003 
SALIENCE AND CONTEXT: 1992-2009
The core hypothesis is that people living in chang ing communities will have more negative attitudes on immigration provided that immigration is nationally salient, and thus that frames related to immigration are available to politicize people's day-to-day experi ences. This section provides initial evidence for those claims using a pooled data set of eleven surveys con ducted from 1992 to 2009. It shows that the results hold across a wide variety of salience measures and model specifications. It is interested not in overall lev els of anti-immigrant sentiment, but instead in how the distribution of anti-immigration sentiment across U.S. communities varies over time.
To measure the salience of immigration, we created an index of monthly mentions of immigration by two network news programs (ABC News and CBS News) and the country's most widely circulated newspaper (USA Today).
Specifically, we used the Vanderbilt Television News Archive and the LexisNexis database to identify all stories mentioning "immigration" or "im migrants" for each month from January 1992 through Tichenor 2002, 14) , at the time of the North American Free Trade Agreement, a Haitian refugee crisis, a Cuban refugee crisis, and California's Proposition 187 (which barred undocu mented immigrants from public assistance). Newspa pers during this period commonly referred to the "wave 6 The minimum response rate for 2000 national sample was 17.2%. For the two follow-up waves, it was 36% and 33%, respectively. 2007) , and USA Today had the largest circulation of any newspaper (Glaberson 1994) . Average monthly coverage in each of these venues is correlated at or above 0.60, with coverage in the other two venues. 2007 2009 1991 1993 1997 1999 2001 National Unemployment S 05 co ce 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 of anti-immigrant sentiment" (Flores 1993) . Immigra tion then disappeared from public attention in the late 
Measuring Local Demographics
To measure whether local contextual influence varied along with national salience, this section models sup port for immigration in a pooled data set with 15,851 respondents living in 1,908 different counties. Together, the eleven surveys used here include interviews con ducted in 39 separate months.11 The key contextual variable is the change in the county's percent immi grant. Here, we discuss how best to measure it. The vast majority of analyses of local context rely on the decennial U.S. Census. Yet even if we add the 2006 American Community Survey, which provides es timates for 78% of the U.S. population, we still observe county-level immigration at just four points in time: 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2006 . In the following analyses, surveys taken in years zero through six of the Census cycle use the prior two Census years to measure de mographics and changes. For example, the 2004 survey is matched to local demographics in 1990 and 2000.
Surveys taken in years eight or nine use the subse quent Census (or American Community Survey data), so the 1998 NES measures the change from 1990 to 2000 as well. The results reported here are not sen sitive to these specific thresholds. Still, this empirical strategy raises a key question: can observations from these four years provide an accurate representation of local demographic changes? This question takes on special importance when studying recent years, as immigrants have increasingly bypassed the traditional gateway cities in favor of new immigrant destinations (Frey 2006; McConnell 2008) . The potential measure ment error might lead us to understate the full impact of demographic changes.
Our ability to measure local demographic changes using Census data hinges on the year-to-year variation in these changes. If counties show rapid fluctuations in year-to-year immigrant inflows, Census-based mea sures will prove inadequate. However, the initial ev idence shows the reverse: even over decades, inflows show impressive stability. Weighting counties by pop ulation, we find that the correlation between county level immigrant inflow in the 1980s and 1990s is 0.62. Put another way, of the 782 U.S. counties that saw inflows above the 75th percentile in the 1980s, 57% 11 Decomposing the variance in the salience measure using a multi level model (Gelman and Hill 2006) , we see that 66% of the variation in national salience is across surveys, while the remainder is within a given survey. of them remained above the 75th percentile in the 1990s, and 74% were above the median. Even for the 1990s and the six years from 2000 to 2006, a period of dispersion to new immigrant destinations, the correla tion is 0.47. Given research on chain migration and the role of immigrant social networks in facilitating migra tion (e.g., Massey et al. 1987; McConnell 2008) , these strong correlations across decades are not surprising. For both economic and social reasons, today's immi grants follow in the footsteps of yesterday's immigrants, making use of preexisting networks to find homes and jobs. This induces stable patterns of change over time.
Of course, the threat to validity here is the possibility of low correlations within a decade, so the results on cross-decade correlations provide a conservative test of the stability of immigrant inflows. The Appendix thus turns to annual data for 157 large counties compiled from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to further validate the Census-based approach adopted here. The critical result: an interpolation using just three years of county-level immigration data correlates with an an nual time series covering all 13 years of CPS data at 0.78 on average.12 Measuring county-level immigrant populations using observations every six to ten years is clearly an approximation, but it still captures the key trends within counties. The fact that county-level change is stable over time reduces our concerns about mismeasurement, but it raises a second potential problem?can we differenti ate large immigrant populations from growing immi grant populations? Across U.S. counties, the Pearson's correlation between the 1990 percent immigrant and the change over the 1990s is 0.43. For 2000 and the change between 2000 and 2006, the comparable corre lation is 0.25. In short, counties with large immigrant populations tend to see those populations grow over the period in question, but the relationship is weaker than the relationship between changes over time, and it is far from deterministic. At first glance, these results might seem to undercut the notions of chain migration just invoked. But during this period, chain migration seems to operate more in flows than in stocks. Put dif ferently, the places that facilitated immigrant growth in one year typically continued to do so in the next, but not all communities with large immigrant populations attracted continued migration. For example, Washing ton County in northwest Arkansas saw its immigrant population grow briskly from a baseline of 1.6% in both the 1990s and the early 2000s. It remained a pop ular destination throughout this period. In contrast, 36.2% of Los Angeles residents were foreign born in 2000, but that number actually declined slightly in the subsequent six years.13
Figure 2 presents a U.S. map emphasizing those fast changing counties that drive the results that follow. By using the residuals from a regression of 1990s changes on the 1990 share of immigrants, it illustrates the coun ties where the immigrant population grew more rapidly than expected based on their initial share of immi grants. If we consider the largest 5% of residuals, for example, we see that the counties where the immi grant growth exceeds baseline levels by the most are concentrated in the South and West. Twelve percent of these counties are in Texas, 11% are in Florida, 10% are in North Carolina, 10% are in Kansas, and 8% are in Colorado. Foreign-born immigrants respond to the same incentives as migrants overall: the Pear son's correlation between the change in the percent foreign born and the logged total change in popula tion is 0.37. As with all county-level maps, it is impor tant to note that counties vary markedly in popula tion and size, and that states vary in their number of counties.
Models
As an initial measure of immigration's salience, the analysis matches each respondent to the average level of immigration coverage in the six months prior to the respondent's interview. Missing data were multiply im puted (King et al. 2001; Schafer 1997) , although the results are not sensitive to this choice.14 The dependent variable is 0 for the 54% of respon dents who want to decrease immigration and 1 for oth ers. This dependent variable is measured in all surveys (except the 2000 SCCBS) with the question: "Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?"15 As others have noted (Schildkraut 2009 ), the five-category variable is quite skewed, with only 2.9% of respondents advocating increasing immigration "a lot" and another 5.6% advocating increasing immigration "a little." For the following analyses, if the person reports "increased a lot," "increased a little," or "remain the same," the immigrants and attitudes alongside the powerful inter action effect. The analysis then simulated the impact of shifting from the 5th percentile respondent's county to the 95th percentile respondent's county at a time when immigration was receiving little national attention.18 Averaging across the years, we see that when immi gration is not generating many headlines, the attitudes of people in changing counties are almost identical.
People in rapidly changing counties are just one-tenth of a percentage point more likely to want to decrease immigration. Yet, during a period of high salience, the same contextual difference is associated with a much larger attitudinal difference of 9.9 percentage points. The 95% confidence interval now runs from 3.6 to 16.2 percentage points. That mean effect is 20% of the de pendent variable's standard deviation (49.8 percentage points), and is a sizable impact. During high salience periods, the influence of living in a changing county increases by 9.8 percentage points, a figure given in the final column of Table l .19 In fact, the impact is notewor thy even when compared to the 21.3 percentage point swing in average national proimmigration sentiment from its minimum (34.6% in late 1994) to its maximum (55.9% in late 2000).
To further explore the substantive impacts, the anal ysis then used the model to calculate predicted proba bilities for twenty scenarios, varying both the level of 16 There are at least 803 respondents per survey, and the model above already allows coefficients to vary across the surveys, so esti mating multilevel models clustered by survey should not significantly affect these results (Snijders and Bosker 1999) . This intuition was confirmed by reestimating the model discussed here using a gener alized linear mixed model, estimated via penalized quasilikelihood (Schall 1991 ). The multilevel model assumes that the intercepts (?oj ), the slopes for the level of immigration (?q), and the slopes for the change in immigration (?y ) were drawn from normal distributions. 17 In this data set, the initial level of immigration correlates with the subsequent change at 0.57.
18
The simulation sets salience to its 5th percentile, indicating an average of one story per month. At the 95th percentile, there are 6.4 total stories per month.
19
The 95% confidence interval runs from 2.2 to 17.5 percentage points. Some might term this impact a "difference-in-difference" estimate because we are comparing changes over time in a treatment group and a control group (see Angrist and Pischke 2009, 227-43, 329) . To avoid confusion, the strategy is referred to here simply as estimating the increased impact in high salience conditions. Still, we should underscore its crucial commonality with difference-in difference estimators: it too eliminates concerns about confounding variables whose influence is fixed over time. salience and the size of the demographic change. To ensure that the scenarios are plausible, we consider the minimum and maximum levels of salience observed in two discrete years: 1994 and 2006. In 1994, salience in the prior six months spiked from its 50th (2.8) to its 95th percentile (6.4); in 2006, it moved from its 30th percentile (1.7) to its maximum (9.2). The analysis also estimated predicted probabilities for a range of demographic shocks, from the 5th percentile respon dent's county (e.g., Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, with a very slight decline of 0.7 percentage points in its immigrant share) to the 95th percentile respondent's county (e.g., Durham County, North Carolina, with a 7.4 percentage point increase).20 The results are given in Table 2 .
As Table 2 makes clear, the expected difference be tween changing and static counties grows far larger when immigration is salient in national politics.21 For example, in the 1994 low-salience scenario, people in fast-changing counties are 7.3 percentage points less likely to hold proimmigration views than those in static counties. But when its salience is high, the gap becomes 15.1 percentage points. These estimates, combined with the map in Figure 2 , suggest that national attention to immigration will catalyze anti-immigration sentiment in rapidly changing areas like North Carolina, Florida, and Colorado, while having an offsetting effect in Ohio, upstate New York, and other places without compara ble influxes.
Concerns about selection bias commonly plague es timates of local contextual effects. When observing a correlation between someone's local environment and his or individual attitudes, it is often impossible to know whether that correlation was induced by the local con text or associated with the factors that led her to live in that context. But since we estimate the change in a con textual effect given a sudden shift in salience, ongoing 20 Throughout these analyses, percentiles are defined with reference to the nationally representative survey sample, and not the distri bution of counties. Thus, the 25th percentile refers to a respondent whose county is changing faster than the counties of 25% of other respondents. 21 Table 2 also illustrates that spikes in salience tend to have a positive impact for most respondents, although that pattern reverses itself for those living in the most rapidly changing counties. For a respondent in the median county in terms of demographic change, the 1994 increase in salience leads to a 4.8 percentage point increase in proimmigration attitudes.
processes of residential selection are effectively held constant. Selection biases cannot explain why a context would be correlated with attitudes at one point in time but not soon after.
Alternative Measures and Models
Are these estimates sensitive to the choices outlined previously? To probe their robustness, the analyses reestimated the model using differing lagged lengths of the original salience measure, as shown in the sub sequent rows of Table ? . Although the variance of the estimated interaction effect increases relative to its magnitude, leading to slightly higher p values, the results remain substantively and statistically significant with varying lags. For example, when the lag is three months, the impact grows by an estimated is 9.3 per centage points, with a 95% confidence interval from 0.3 percentage points to 18.2 percentage points. The broad conclusions drawn previously are not sensitive to assumptions about lags.
One might also wonder if the effect is driven by particular immigrant groups. Local changes in immi grant populations overall are highly correlated with both Hispanic inflows (Pearson's r = 0.81) and Asian American inflows (Pearson's r = 0.69). As of 2003, these groups accounted for 53% and 25% of the U.S.
foreign-born population, respectively, making them key groups with which to start. When we modify the sparse model to include separate terms for the local Hispanic and Asian-descended populations, both show negative, near-significant interactions with the salience of immigration.23 Both ethnic groups appear to pro duce reactions in line with the notion of politicized places, but given the limits of the data, we cannot know if the impact of salience differs systematically by group. However, the same approach does illustrate that the effect is not driven by general population loss or gains: the core interaction remains (p = .03, two-sided test)
when we also interact the county's population change with immigration's national salience. 
Alternative Explanations
The national salience of immigration is certainly not the only factor that varies across the 39 surveyed months, so the analysis also considered alternative, time-varying explanations. Drawing on theories of economic conflict (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and of sociotropic economic thinking (e.g., Citrin et al. 1997) , one might suspect that when national economic conditions are poor, people will be more concerned about local demo graphic changes. We thus estimated an alternate ver sion of the full model above including an interaction be tween county-level immigrant inflows and the national unemployment rate, measured monthly by the Bureau 24 The results are substantively identical when also conditioning on the change in the percent black, the change in logged household income, and the change in the percent with a bachelor's degree. In addition, we do not see that the interaction is stronger when focusing on changing communities with high or low baseline levels of immigrants, indicating that the finding is not driven by new immigrant destinations or traditional gateways alone. The same is true for the September 11 analyses that follow. 25 Nor is it sensitive to the inclusion of a set of interactions between the percent change and the survey, an especially conservative speci fication that isolates the within-survey variation in salience.
of Labor Statistics. The national unemployment rate itself proves a strong predictor of wanting to decrease immigration, but the interaction between the unem ployment rate and local changes never approaches sig nificance (? = -0.48, SE = 1.27). Nor does the change in national gross domestic product (GDP) over the past year interact with local immigrant inflows: there, the estimated coefficient is ?0.13, with a standard error of 0.09. Another threat to validity is that the surveys differ in the time that has elapsed since the Census or American Community Survey. But even if we mea sure that gap and interact it with the change in the percent immigrant, we find no strong interaction effect (? = 3.6, SE = 2.6). Moreover, in none of these cases do we observe significant changes in the interaction between salience and local demographic changes.
Levels and changes in the local immigrant popu lation share are correlated, so an additional analysis investigates whether salience interacts with levels of local immigrant populations rather than with changes in those populations. To address this possibility, the analysis reestimated the basic model by including an interaction between local immigration levels and na tional salience instead of the interaction with changes, and by allowing the change coefficients to vary by survey.26 In this model, we again find a nega tive interaction, albeit one that is not quite statis tically significant (?=-0.26, SE = 0.14, two-sided p value = 0.07).27 However, this result is far more sensi tive to specification than the change interaction: it be comes both substantively and statistically insignificant if we instead measure frames (0= ?0.007, SE = 0.27) or use a three-month lag in the salience measure (?=-0.09, S? = 0.09). In short, in this particular ex ample, there is some evidence that levels of immigra tion can be politicized, but that evidence is less certain and less consistent than the evidence on changes.
One additional threat to validity comes from the pos sibility of endogeneity in the salience of immigration. If immigration becomes salient because changing com munities express concern about it, the causal arrow would be reversed. However, the six-month lag struc ture employed previously makes it highly unlikely that this form of endogeneity explains those results: salience is measured months prior to reported attitudes. As we saw previously, over-time or panel data are especially valuable, because they allow us to eliminate the alternative explanation of residen tial selection. If there are underlying factors that are related to both people's choice of community and their attitudes toward immigration, those factors will be cap tured in the first survey. In fact, the same logic holds for any alternative explanation that points to events that occurred prior to the first wave of the survey.
In addition, these surveys help us differentiate the impact of immigration's general salience from national economic conditions, another potential national-level influence commonly linked to immigration attitudes (Barkan 2003; Citrin et al. 1997; Higham 1992 The left side of Figure 3 presents the resulting pre dicted probabilities from separate models, given a shift in the key independent variable from its 5th to its 95th percentile. That independent variable is the change in the county's percent immigrant from 1990 to 2000. Its 5th percentile is a county that is essentially static, with a 0.07 percentage point decline in its foreign-born share. The 95th percentile indicates a county where the percent foreign born increased by 8.5 percentage points. For each of the three estimated effects, Figure 3 provides the probability that the effect is positive. In October 2001, with September 11 just a month before, those respondents in changing communities were dra matically more likely to strongly agree that immigrants are too demanding. The average effect is 23.7 percent age points, with a 95% confidence interval from 9.2 to 39.5 percentage points. At baseline in Fall 2000, there was no such effect. In fact, the estimated im pact increases by 26.5 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval from 11.0 to 43.1 percentage points.
By subtracting one estimated impact from another, we remove residential self-selection and other biases that 28 As compared to the previous models, there are two subtractions and one other addition: partisan identification was not asked in the 2000 SCCBS, so only ideology is available to measure a respondent's political orientation. Age squared is so highly correlated with age that it is dropped. Also, the analysis here includes a measure of the respondent's satisfaction with her financial situation from the first survey administration. Change in Probability Change in Probability
Notes: These figures depict the results of three ordered probit models predicting agreement that immigrants are getting too demanding in their push for rights. They illustrate the predicted increase in anti-immigrant attitudes when shifting from the 5th to the 95th percentile immigrant inflow, and show how the contextual effect was strong immediately after the September 11 attacks. The p-values give the probability of a positive shift. At left, context is measured at the county level, and at right it is measured at the ZIP code level. In the graph, each density has been standardized to have the same height.
are fixed across surveys. We can reject the null hypoth esis of a constant effect from Fall 2000 to October 2001 (p < .01, two-sided test). This result proves insensitive to a wide range of more sparse model specifications as well. Figure A .l in the appendix provides graphical representations of the three full fitted models. The politicizing effect of September 11 was brief as well as big. As the immigration-related frames receded from public view, so, too, did the contextual effect. Just five months after September 11, after immigration's salience had declined, the median effect was a statisti cally insignificant 1.9 percentage points. This is shown in Figure 3 These figures reflect immigrants' relative concentra tion in certain parts of the country and their lower levels of segregation within a given area (Fischer 2003 
ANALYZING LOCAL ACTIONS
The politicized places hypothesis provides leverage on when localities consider anti-immigrant actions as well as individual attitude change. This section uses data on local anti-immigrant actions to further establish the role of demographic change in catalyzing anti immigrant politics. Even conditional on the propor tion of immigrants currently in the community, an in creasing share of immigrants is a powerful predictor of which localities consider anti-immigrant policies. Cer tainly, the federal government retains sole responsi bility for setting levels of immigration, but in recent years localities have taken unilateral action on a vari ety of immigrant-related issues, from schooling to zon ing. Although we do not observe all of the politics of these proposals, they undoubtedly reflect the changing strategic landscape for local leaders on the issue of immigration.
31 Census tracts change with each Census, and 55% of the SCCBS respondents were missing data on their 1990 Census tract, mak ing it impossible to estimate the same models without significant imputation-based uncertainty or listwise deletion.
The key dependent variable in these analyses is the consideration or passage of a local anti-immigrant or dinance by a U.S. municipality.32 We identified these localities by searching LexisNexis for the joint ap pearance of "local" and "anti-immigrant" anywhere in articles appearing in 258 regional newspapers from 2000 to 2006. We then conducted a separate search for articles using "English only" in their headline or lead paragraph, a phrase common in articles describ ing localities considering making English their only or official language. We skimmed the resulting 3,378 articles to identify anti-immigrant proposals. For in stance, towns such as Hazleton, Pennsylvania, passed measures mandating fines for those who employ or rent to undocumented immigrants, whereas others consid ered using zoning or policing to target undocumented immigrants. We also included symbolic measures, such as a mayor's request for a McDonald's to remove a Spanish-language billboard. In all, this preliminary procedure led to the identifi cation of 52 Census-designated places that had consid ered anti-immigrant proposals during this period. Fifty eight percent of these ordinances were first discussed during or after Summer 2006, just after the issue had appeared on the national agenda. This timing offers another piece of evidence of the local aftershocks of a nationally salient issue. We can augment the first list for 2006 by adding a second list of 76 communities, avail able through FIRM (2007) .33 Table 3 This comparison includes every Census-designated place in the U.S. To focus attention on those locali ties that are most comparable, to make the collection of additional data more efficient, and to avoid model dependence (Ho et al. 2007) , the analysis then used ge netic matching (Diamond and Sekhon 2008) to match the 108 localities that did take anti-immigrant actions to 216 highly similar communities that did not. Specif ically, starting with the 108 communities, the analysis used a genetic algorithm to search for two matched communities that appear nearly identical on key in dependent variables but that did not go on to take anti-immigrant actions.34 Such a matched comparison, also known as a case-control design (King and Zeng 2002) , focuses our attention on the dynamic precursors of anti-immigrant actions, and it also allows us to col lect additional political measures for this new, smaller sample. Table 3 compares the matched groups as of 2000, and demonstrates that they are generally similar even a decade after the matching.35 This analysis holds constant 1990 levels of immigrants, meaning that it does not allow for tests of the relative predictive power of levels and changes. Instead, it provides an opportunity to confirm that changes influence local political out comes as well as local attitudes.
To identify the dynamic factors that encourage anti immigrant actions, the analysis then used logistic re gression on the matched sample with each locality weighted by its probability of inclusion. The indepen dent variables test common approaches to explain ing local anti-immigrant outcomes. For instance, to test the prediction that anti-immigrant proposals stem from local competition over resources (Olzak 1992, 37) , the model included measures of logged median household income and unemployment rates, as well as their changes from 1990 to 2000. The politicized places approach, in contrast, posits that in periods of high salience, sudden demographic change can influence at titudes on related issues. The model thus includes both the level and change in the percent immigrant. The model also conditions on the percent and change in the percent African American, as well as home ownership, population density, and partisanship (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010 Table 4 presents the results. The first two columns present the coefficient and standard error from the logistic regression. The third and fourth columns pro vide the mean in-sample probability of considering an anti-immigrant measure given that the indepen dent variable in question is set at its 10th percentile or 90th percentile, respectively, with all others set at their means.38 The final two columns provide the pre dicted probabilities of considering an anti-immigrant proposal for the population of all U.S. localities, which involves correcting to account for the population inci dence as outlined in King and Zeng (2002) . Commu nities that saw relative declines in household income from 1990 to 2000 were more likely to consider anti immigrant proposals, in keeping with the notion that resource scarcity might turn native-born Americans against immigrants. The impact of rising relative unem ployment rates from 1991 to 2000 is contingent on the local percent immigrant, as shown by the interaction term. 9
Where there are no immigrants, rising rela tive unemployment decreases the probability of con sidering anti-immigrant action sharply. As depicted in Table 4 , in a community with an average level of im migrants for this sample (11%), rising relative unem ployment has a slight dampening effect, reducing the probability of considering an anti-immigrant action from .52 to .45. In communities where more than 20% of the residents are immigrants, rising relative unem ployment increases the probability of considering an anti-immigrant ordinance. Rising unemployment has a stronger positive relationship with anti-immigrant or dinances in the presence of immigrants. Yet, we should not conclude that resource scarcity alone explains anti immigrant ordinances, since on net, communities with few immigrants and falling unemployment consider or dinances 0.72 of the time, whereas those with many immigrants and stable unemployment levels consider ordinances 0.54 of the time.
When the change in unemployment is held at its mean, higher levels of immigrants actually depress anti immigrant ordinances, reducing the probability of con sidering an ordinance from .55 to .37 within this sample. Looking instead at changing demographics, we see that bias, Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) show that partisanship is a powerful predictor of both restrictionist and "pro-immigrant" local ordinances. tering. Another consideration is community associa tions, since they might facilitate community integration and reduce the tensions associated with an influx of immigrants (Deufel 2006, chapter 9 ). Yet, models not shown also included measures of county-level associ ational density in 1990 and the change from 1990 to 1997, demonstrating no substantive difference in the results.40 Another possibility is that anti-immigrant ordi nances are motivated by rising crime rates, an argument that has been advanced by defenders of Hazleton's recent ordinance. Yet, strikingly, places with higher crime rates as of 1999 prove less likely to consider anti-immigrant ordinances. Localities in counties with 1,940 crimes per 100,000 people in 1999 had a .54 prob ability of considering an anti-immigrant ordinance, whereas localities with 6,347 crimes per 100,000 peo ple had a .43 probability. Those are the 10th and 90th percentiles, respectively. Far from encouraging anti immigrant ordinances, high county-level crime rates do the opposite, perhaps by reconfiguring local agen das. Overall, the locality-level results echo key findings 40 The source of the associational density measure is Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater (2005 The model specification is identical to that in Table 4. political activity comes from rapidly changing places, especially at times when immigration is capturing na tional headlines.
CONCLUSION
Scholars have often concluded that Americans' ethnic and racial surroundings influence their attitudes and political behavior. Yet, the politicized places hypoth esis provides a different approach, one that suggests that contextual effects are far less ubiquitous. Those who live near larger proportions of immigrants do not consistently exhibit more negative attitudes. Instead, at least as far as immigrants are concerned, people re spond to the demographics of their communities only under specific circumstances. When faced with a sud den, destabilizing change in local demographics, and when salient national rhetoric politicizes that demo graphic change, people's views turn anti-immigrant. In other conditions, local demographics might go largely unnoticed, or else might remain depoliticized. This study departs from past work on local encounters pri marily in its emphasis on the pace of demographic change and on the availability of external, politiciz ing agents. It also departs from past work by its char acterization that as far as immigrants are concerned, threatened responses are best thought of as a product of exceptional times, and not as the norm.
This approach could be useful in explaining local responses to other social groups. The hypothesis ad vanced here operates on the assumption that local en counters are not political unless available frames help make them so. Racial cleavages have varied markedly in their framing over time (e.g., Kellstedt 2003), mak ing them an obvious potential extension. Class cleav ages are another. Yet, in extending the hypothesis, it is important to acknowledge that it is likely to be differentially applicable. Some social cleavages might not follow these patterns because they lack prominent nationwide frames or because those frames have no obvious connections to local demographics. Others, perhaps including racial cleavages, might not follow this pattern because the accompanying frames are so prevalent as to not need any priming by the media. For politicized places to operate, the cleavage needs to be amenable to framing but not consistently framed. We should also acknowledge the possibility that in some cases, it is not social cleavages but specific issues that might be politicized. For instance, it is quite conceivable that the local politics of taxation differ during periods when taxes are salient nationally versus when they are not.
Scholars of the local politics of immigration have fo cused on explaining cross-sectional variation, whereas those interested in the national level have paid more attention to over-time variation (e.g., Tichenor 2002).
By incorporating both, the politicized places approach provides a way to engage national and local trends si multaneously. For example, the results presented here seem to contradict Freeman (1995) , a national-level study that contends that opposition to immigration develops long after the immigrants' arrival. In this view, immigration's costs are diffuse and its benefits concentrated, making it difficult and time consuming for those opposed to immigration to mobilize. Yet, Freeman is discussing how immigration is incorporated into national politics, whereas this study focuses on when immigration becomes politicized locally. If anti immigrant forces take years to mobilize and respond to immigration nationally, then immigration might be come salient only decades after the arrival of the initial immigrants. We might thus expect increases in anti immigrant politics when immigration has been high for some time nationally but geographically dispersed only recently.
Such is exactly the constellation of factors facing the contemporary U.S. Over time, immigration rises in na tional salience as the size of the immigrant population reaches a critical mass, as immigration's opponents be come organized and vocal, and as political elites sense an opportunity. With the available political rhetoric, residents in changing communities can then respond to those demographic changes. Coupling national and local approaches in this way, we can also understand why some of the countries with the largest increases in their share of immigrants are not disproportionately anti-immigrant (Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2005) . Often, national and local politics are conceptualized as separate and independent political arenas. The core claim underpinning the politicized places hypothesis is that the two interact: even day-to-day encounters can be shaped by salient national issues. 
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